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Given a checkpoint and communication pattern of a distributed execution,
the No Z-Cycle property (NZC) states that a dependency between a check-
point and itself does not exist. In other words, a noncausal sequence of
messages that starts after a checkpoint and terminates before that checkpoint
does not exist. From an operational point of view, this property corresponds
to the fact that each checkpoint belongs to at least one consistent global
checkpoint. So it could be used, for example, for restarting a distributed
application after the occurrence of a failure. In this paper we derive a charac-
terization of the NZC property (previously an open problem). It identifies
a subset of Z-cycles, namely core Z-cycles (CZCs), that has to be empty in
order that the checkpoint and communication pattern of the execution satisfies
the NZC property. Then, we present a communication-induced checkpointing
protocol that prevents CZCs on-the-fly. This protocol actually removes the
common causal part to any CZC. Finally we propose a taxonomy of com-
munication-induced checkpointing protocols that ensure the NZC property.
 2000 Academic Press
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1. INTRODUCTION
A checkpoint and communication pattern of a distributed execution consists of a
set of local checkpoints and a dependency relation defined over them due to inter-
process communication [23]. A local checkpoint is the local state of a process
recorded on stable storage. Dependencies are caused by chains of messages in the
execution called zigzag paths (Z-paths for short) [18]. A Z-path is a particular
sequence of messages [m1 , ..., mq] such that the sending of a message mi belongs to
the same, or to a successive, checkpoint interval of the delivery of the message mi&1
(a checkpoint interval is the set of events between two successive checkpoints in the
same process). Z-paths can be split in two families: causal Z-paths which are actually
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FIG. 1. A causal Z-path from A to B (a), a noncausal Z-path from A to B (b), and a Z-cycle
involving A (c).
causal paths (as an example a causal Z-path from the checkpoint A to the checkpoint
B formed by [m1 , m2] is shown in Fig. 1a) and noncausal Z-paths in which there exists
at least one message mi whose send precedes the delivery of mi&1 in the same check-
point interval (Fig. 1b shows the noncausal Z-path from A to B formed by [m1 , m2]).
Due to the presence of noncausal Z-paths, a message chain could start after a
checkpoint and terminate before that checkpoint. In that case a dependency relation is
established between a checkpoint and itself. This pattern, called the Z-cycle (ZC), has
been formalized by Netzer and Xu [18]. As an example, the sequence of messages
[m2 , m3 , m1] shown in Fig. 1c involves the checkpoint A in a Z-cycle.
A checkpoint and communication pattern of a distributed execution satisfies the
no-Z-cycle property (NZC) if it does not contain any Z-cycles. NZC has a
noteworthy feature: a checkpoint which is not involved in any Z-cycle belongs at least
to one consistent global checkpoint. A global checkpoint of a distributed execution
is a collection of local checkpoints, one for each process. A global checkpoint is
consistent [5] if, for any pair of its checkpoints, no one happens before [14] another.
As a consequence the NZC property has applications in many dependability problems
such as determination of distributed breakpoints [9], determination of shared global
states of a distributed execution [10], and rollback recovery [7]. As an example,
in the context of rollback recovery, ensuring the NZC property means rollback
without the risk of a domino effect1 [19] and simple and efficient solutions for the
recovery line computation and the garbage collection problem2 [7].
This paper presents a characterization of the NZC property. This result has
been obtained from the introduction of concatenation relations on message chains
and checkpoints that allow, in an easy way, the expression of the basic structure of
checkpoint and communication patterns. The characterization lies on core Z-cycles
(CZCs) which are Z-cycle with several constraints on their structure. We prove that
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1 The domino effect consists of an unbounded rollback propagation that, upon the occurrence of a
failure, forces a distributed application to be resumed from its initial state as no recent consistent global
checkpoint can be built while rolling back.
2 Recovery line computation consists of finding the consistent global checkpoint closest to the end of
the execution from which a distributed application can be resumed after a failure. Garbage collection
allows us to discard from stable storage all checkpoints related to events that occurred before the last
computed recovery line.
NZC  NCZC (no-core-Z-cycle) where the NCZC property means that the
checkpoint and communication pattern of the execution does not contain any CZC3.
The previous characterization is important not only from a theoretical point of
view but also from a practical one as we can derive checkpointing protocols that
ensure the NZC property on-the-fly. In particular we introduce a family of com-
munication-induced checkpointing protocols (FNZC) based on the following basic
hypothesis: (1) the usable knowledge at a certain event can not be more than the
one included in the causal past of that event, and (2) the execution is asynchronous;
i.e., no bound exists on the process’ speed and on the message transfer delay. Basing
on these hypotheses Z-cycles cannot be tracked on-the-fly as they are noncausal in
nature. A protocol preventing the formation of a particular checkpoint and com-
munication pattern, namely suspect core Z-cycles (SCZC), is proposed. The SCZC
patten represents the causal part of any core Z-cycle. As it is causal, it is on-the-fly
trackable by a protocol belonging to FNZC . The prevention of SCZC patterns is
done by taking forced checkpoints. This action is directed by a predicate that
exploits the control information piggybacked on the incoming messages and the
local history of a process. More specifically, we assume each process Pi selects some
local states to be local checkpoints (basic checkpoints); then, upon the delivery of
a message m, a process Pi is directed to take a forced checkpoint if message m is
‘‘closing’’ an SCZC pattern. The proposed protocol piggybacks on each application
message a matrix of n_n integers where n represents the number of processes of the
execution.
Recently Helary et al. [11] showed that ensuring NZC is a particular application
of the virtual precedence property (VP), defined on an interval-based abstraction
of a distributed execution. If the abstraction satisfies VP, then it is possible to
associate a timestamping function with intervals such that intervals which are con-
nected by a message are timestamped in a nondecreasing way (safety part) and the
timestamp of a process increases after communication (liveness part). In the check-
pointing problem, intervals of the abstraction correspond to checkpoint intervals
and the abstraction of the distributed execution corresponds to a checkpoint and
communication pattern. In this context it has been shown that VP  NZC [11].
From the previous equivalence, it comes out that one can ensure NZC either by
using a checkpointing protocol relying on a particular timestamping function that
satisfies VP or by preventing the formation of particular checkpoint and com-
munication patterns which are necessary to form a Z-cycle. Informally, the former
method ensures NZC ‘‘passing through’’ VP while the second ensures VP
‘‘passing through’’ NZC.
Based on previous observation, we propose, at the last contribution of this paper,
a taxonomy of communication-induced checkpointing protocols in FNZC that
splits them into two classes according to the way they ‘‘see’’ the equivalence
between VP and NZC, namely VP-enforced and VP-accordant protocols.
A VP-enforced protocol assumes the existence of a timestamping function that labels
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3 In the remainder of the paper we denote in uppercase a specific checkpoint and communication
pattern, in bold uppercase a set of checkpoint and communication patterns of the same type and in
calligraphic style properties related to checkpoint and communication patterns.
checkpoint intervals. A forced checkpoint is taken each time either safety or liveness
of the function is going to be violated. A VP-accordant protocol does not use a
timestamping function but prevents the formation of particular checkpoint and
communication patterns in the execution. The protocol proposed in this paper
belongs to the latter class. To the best of our knowledge this is the first taxonomy
that splits communication-induced protocols according to a homogeneous criterion,
namely, the equivalence between VP and NZC.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model of the distributed execution. The notion of a message chain and the concept
of the Z-cycle are formally introduced in Section 3. In the same section we intro-
duce two concatenation relations that will be used to express the structure of check-
point and communication patterns. In Section 4 the CZC is introduced, and the
result NZC  NCZC is proved. Section 5 presents the communication-induced
checkpointing protocol derived from the previous characterization. In the final sec-
tion we discuss the relation between the NZC property and the VP property
introduced by Helary et al. in [11], and we present the taxonomy of checkpointing
protocols in FNZC .
2. THE MODEL OF A DISTRIBUTED EXECUTION
We assume a distributed execution consisting of a set of n processes [P1 , P2 , ..., Pn].
Processes do not share memory and do not share a common clock value. They com-
municate only by exchanging messages. Each pair of processes is connected by an
asynchronous, directed logical channel. Transmission delays over channels are
unpredictable but finite.
A process produces a sequence of events; each event moves the process from one
local state to another. The hth event in process Pi is denoted as ei, h . We assume
events are produced by the execution of internal, send, or deliver statements. The
send and deliver events of a message m are denoted respectively by send(m) and
deliver(m).
Definition 2.1. In process Pi and event ei, h precedes an event ei, k , denoted
ei, h OP ei, k , if and only if hk.
Definition 2.2. An event ei, h of process Pi precedes an event ej, k of process Pj
due to message m, denoted ei, h Om ej, k , if and only if:
(ei, h=send(m)) 7 (ej, k=deliver(m)).
Lamport’s happened-before relation [14], denoted as we , is the transitive
closure of the union of relations OP and Om . Let H be the set of all the events
produced by a distributed execution; the execution can be modeled as a partial
order H =(H, we ).
A local state of a process saved on stable storage is called a local checkpoint of
the process. A local state is not necessarily recorded as a local checkpoint, so the
set of local checkpoints is a subset of the set of local states.
The x th checkpoint of process Pi is denoted as Ci, x where x is called the rank
of the checkpoint. The rank of checkpoints of a process increases monotonically
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each time a checkpoint is taken the rank is increased by one. We assume that each
process Pi takes an initial checkpoint Ci, 1 (corresponding to the initial state of the
process) and that after each event a checkpoint will eventually be taken. A check-
point interval Ii, x is the set of events between Ci, x and Ci, x+1 . Among checkpoint
intervals let us define the following relation based on the happened-before relation:
Definition 2.3. A checkpoint interval Ii, x precedes a checkpoint interval Ij, y ,
denoted Ii, x w
I Ij, y , if and only if:
_ei, x$ # Ii, x , _ej, y$ # Ij, y : ei, x$ w
e e j, y$ .
Note that precedence between intervals is not transitive. Let us finally introduce
the concept of a checkpoint and communication pattern related to a distributed
execution:
Definition 2.4. A checkpoint and communication pattern of a distributed
execution is a pair (H , CH ) where H is a distributed execution and CH is a set of
local checkpoints defined on H .
3. BACKGROUND THEORY AND PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS
This section introduces the notions of causal and noncausal message chains and
two concatenation relations which are used to express the causal, or noncausal,
combination of checkpoints andor chains of messages. Finally, the concept of a
Z-cycle is reformulated using the concatenation relations.
3.1. Message Chains
Definition 3.1. A message chain is a sequence of messages ‘=[m1 , m2 , ..., ml]
such that:
\k: 1kl&1 O (deliver(mk) # Ii, x) 7 (send(mk+1) # Ii, y) 7 (x y).
As an example, in Fig. 1b we have a message chain formed by messages [m1 , m2].
A particular case of a message chain is the causal message chain, in which the deliver
event of a message always precedes on a process the send event of the successive
message of the chain. More formally we have:
Definition 3.2. A message chain ‘=[m1 , m2 , ..., ml] is causal if
\k: 1kl&1 O deliver(mk)OP send(mk+1);
otherwise, the chain is noncausal.
An example of a causal message chain is the one formed by messages [m1 , m2]
in Fig. 1a. A chain with only one message is always causal. For the sake of clarity,
the Greek letter + indicates a causal message chain. Furthermore we denote with
‘. first (resp. ‘. last) the first (resp. last) message of a message chain ‘.
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|‘| denotes the number of messages forming the chain ‘ (i.e., its size). In parti-
cular, |‘|=n means that the chain ‘ consists of n messages. We use the operator
minus to denote the removal of a subchain from a chain; for example ‘&‘. last
(resp. ‘&‘. first) denotes a chain obtained from ‘ by removing its last (resp. first)
message and ‘&‘ denotes a chain obtained by removing the subchain ‘ from ‘,
where ‘ can be either the initial or the final part of ‘.
Finally, we denote as S(‘)=[Ij1 , z1 , Ij2 , z2 , ..., Ijl , zl] the sequence of checkpoint
intervals traversed by ‘=[m1 , m2 , ..., ml]; i.e., S(‘)=[Iji , zi | \mi # ‘, send(mi) # Iji , zi ].
3.2. Concatenation Relations
Causal concatenation relation. The causal concatenation relation, denoted by
the symbol b , expresses the causal combination of two objects (an object can be
either a checkpoint or a message chain). It is defined as follows:
Definition 3.3. An object a is causally concatenated to an object b, denoted
a b b, if and only if:
((a#Ci, x) 7 (b#‘) 7 (_v0 : send(‘ . first) # Ii, x+v))
6 ((a#‘) 7 (b#Ci, x) 7 (_v>0 : deliver(‘ . last) # Ii, x&v))
7 ((a#‘) 7 (b#‘$) 7 (deliver(‘ . last)OP send(‘$ . first))).
The following examples of causal concatenation are shown in Fig. 2: (i) ‘ b Ci, x ,
(ii) Ci, x b ‘$, and (iii) ‘ b ‘$. Note that a Z-path from a checkpoint A to a checkpoint
B due to a message chain ‘ can be expressed as A b ‘ b B (for the sake of simplicity
A b ‘ b B stands for (A b ‘) 7 (‘ b B)).
Noncausal concatenation relation. The noncausal concatenation relation, denoted
by the symbol v , expresses the noncausal combination of message chains. It is defined
as follows:
Definition 3.4. A message chain ‘ is noncausally concatenated to a message
chain ‘$ in the checkpoint interval Ik, y , denoted ‘ v
k, y ‘$, if and only if:
(deliver(‘. last) # Ik, y) 7 (send(‘$. first) # Ik, y)
7 (send(‘$.first)OP deliver(‘. last)).
As an example, the noncausal concatenation ‘" vi, x ‘$ is shown in Fig. 2. Whenever
it is not necessary the pair of indices is dropped from the noncausal relation.
FIG. 2. Concatenation relations.
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FIG. 3. The structure of a Z-cycle.
3.3. Concatenation Operators
Let us consider two message chains ‘=[m1 , ..., mq] and ‘$=[m$1 , ..., m$p]. If
‘ b ‘$ (or ‘ v‘$) then, by Definition 3.1, there exists in the checkpoint and com-
munication pattern of the distributed execution a message chain ‘ =[m1 , ..., mq ,
m$1 , ..., m$p]. Therefore, whenever two messages chains are concatenated (either
causally or noncausally), then there exists a chain resulting from that concatenation
and containing all messages of the two original chains. This property allows us to
use concatenation relations applied to message chains also as concatenation operators
generating message chains. For the previous example, the generated message chain
is ‘ =‘ b ‘$ (or, in the case of noncausal concatenation, ‘ =‘ v‘$).
3.4. Z-Cycles and the No-Z-cycle Property
By using previous notations, let us express the notion of a ZC introduced by
Netzer and Xu [18]. Basically, a ZC is a checkpoint and communication pattern
involving a checkpoint Ci, x and a chain ‘ such that ‘ b Ci, x b ‘ (an example of such
a concatenation is shown in Fig. 3a). However, it is always possible to separate ‘
into two subchains, a causal subchain + and a subchain ‘ such that ‘ =+ vk, y ‘ (this
concatenation is shown in Fig. 3b). This observation gives rise to the following
Z-cycle definition:
Definition 3.5. A ZC is a checkpoint and communication pattern ZC(Ci, x , +,
Ik, y , ‘) such that ‘ b Ci, x b + v
k, j ‘.
Let us finally introduce the no-Z-cycle property:
Property 3.1. A checkpoint and communication pattern of a distributed execu-
tion (H , CH ) satisfies the NZC property if and only if no ZC exists in (H , CH ).
4. A CHARACTERIZATION OF THE NO-Z-CYCLE PROPERTY
To get a characterization of the NZC property, successive embedded subsets of
Z-cycles, namely prime Z-cycles (PZCs) and CZCs are introduced, which contain
Z-cycles that satisfy progressively stronger constraints on their checkpoint and
communication pattern structure. In particular, a PZC is a ZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘) with
a constraint on + and, finally, a CZC is a PZC with a constraint on the sequence
of checkpoint intervals associated with ‘.
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FIG. 4. Relations between ZC, PZC, and CZC.
We prove that: (i) if ZC then PZC and (ii) if PZC then CZC. In other words,
each (noncore) Z-cycle involving a checkpoint A embeds a core Z-cycle involving
a checkpoint B (see Fig. 4). This means that ZC is empty if and only if CZC is
empty, as will be proved in the characterization theorem (Section 4.3).
4.1. Prime Z-Cycles
This paragraph introduces the notion of a PZC. It is interesting because of the
result in Lemma 4.2 which states that if there is a Z-cycle in a checkpoint and com-
munication pattern of a distributed execution then there exists in that checkpoint
and communication pattern a PZC whose chain size |‘| is smaller than or equal to
that of the original Z-cycle.
Given a pair (Ci, x , Pk), let us consider the set of causal chains + starting after
Ci, x whose recipient of +. last is Pk , denoted M(Ci, x , Pk). This set is partially
ordered by the relation:
+O+$  deliver(+ . last)OP deliver(+$ . last).
Let min(M(Ci, x , Pk)) denote the set of the minimum elements in M(Ci, x , Pk)4.
This set contains causal chains starting after Ci, x and sharing the last message. By
using these notions the concept of a PZC is introduced as follows:
Definition 4.1 (Prime Z-cycle). ZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘) is a PZC, denoted
PZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘), if and only if + # min(M(Ci, x , Pk)).
As an example, ZC(Ci, x , +$, Ik, y , ‘), shown in Fig. 5, is not a PZC while
ZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘), shown in the same figure, is a PZC. Let us introduce the
following lemma:
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4 A chain + # M(Ci, x , Pk) is a minimum element if there does not exist any chain +$ # M(Ci, x , Pk) such
that +$O+.
FIG. 5. The structure of a ZC and of a PZC.
Lemma 4.1.
If there exists ZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘) such that |‘|=1
then there exists PZC(Ci, x , +$, Ik, y , ‘).
Proof. Let us consider ZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘) such that ‘=m (i.e., |‘|=1). We
have two alternatives:
1. if + # min(M(Ci, x , Pk)) then let us consider +$=+. By Definition 4.1 we get
PZC(Ci, x , +$, Ik, y , ‘) and the claim follows;
2. if +  min(M(Ci, x , Pk)) then let us consider +$ # min(M(Ci, x , Pk)) (note
that +$ exists as M(Ci, x , Pk) is not empty since it contains +).
There are two cases:
2.1. deliver(+$. last) we send(m) (see Fig. 6a).
This is impossible as it would lead to a cycle in the happened-before relation (i.e.,
send(m) we deliver(+$. last)) which is acyclic [14];
2.2. send(m) we deliver(+$. last) (see Fig. 6b).
Thus, by Definition 4.1 we get PZC(Ci, x , +$, Ik, y , ‘) and the claim follows. K
The previous lemma says that if a checkpoint is involved in a Z-cycle whose
chain ‘ has size one, then there exists a PZC involving the same checkpoint. The
following lemma extends the previous result to a chain ‘ of any size:
FIG. 6. Proof of Lemma 4.1.
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Lemma 4.2.
If there exists ZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘)
then there exists PZC(Ci, x , +$, Il, z , ‘$) with |‘$||‘|.
Proof. Let us consider ZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘). We have two alternatives:
1. if |‘|=1 then the claim follows from Lemma 4.1;
2. if |‘|>1 then if + # min(M(Ci, x , Pk)) then the claim trivially follows when
considering +$=+. Otherwise let us consider +$ # min(M(Ci, x , Pk)) (note that +$
exists as M(Ci, x , Pk) is not empty since it contains +).
There are two cases:
2.1. send(‘. first) we deliver(+$. last) (see Fig. 7a).
In this case we get PZC(Ci, x , +$, Ik, y , ‘) and the claim follows;
2.2. deliver(+$. last) we send(‘. first) (see Fig. 7b).
In this case, by construction, we get ZC(Ci, x , [+$ b +"], Ih, w , ‘$) where ‘=+" v
h, w ‘$.
Note that |+"|1 and |‘$|<|‘| (see Fig. 7c).
If we fall into Case 2.2, the previous construction can be repeated on ZC(Ci, x ,
[+$ b +"], Ih, w , ‘$) and after a finite number of steps either we fall in Case 2.1 or we
get ZC(Ci, x , +^, Il, z , ‘ ) with |‘ |=1; thus the claim follows from Lemma 4.2. K
4.2. Core Z-Cycles
This paragraph introduces the notion of a CZC. It is interesting because of the
result in Lemma 4.4 which states that if there is a PZC involving a checkpoint then
there exists a CZC that involves a checkpoint (not necessarily the same checkpoint
involved in the PZC). A CZC is actually a PZC with a restriction on its structure.
This restriction is on the sequence of checkpoint intervals related to its message
chain ‘ as can be seen from the following definition:
Definition 4.2 (Core Z-Cycle). Let us consider PZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘) and let
S(‘) be the sequence of checkpoint intervals associated with ‘. PZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘)
is a core Z-cycle, denoted CZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘), if and only if:
\Iji , zi # S(‘) O c(Iji , zi+1 w
I Ik, y).
Figure 8 shows an example of a CZC involving Ci, x and an example of a PZC
which is not a CZC as it contradicts the restriction in Definition 4.2 (i.e., Ij, z+1 w
I
Ik, y due to the presence of the causal message chain +$). Note that, in the latter
FIG. 7. Proof of Lemma 4.2.
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FIG. 8. A CZC involving Ci, x (a) and an example of PZC involving Ci, x which is not a CZC (b).
case, PZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘) embeds the Z-cycle ZC(Cj, z+1 , +$, Ik, y , (‘&‘. last)) as
shown in Fig. 8b. This recursive behavior will be exploited in the proof of
Lemma 4.4.
Let us now prove that if there exists a PZC in a checkpoint and communication
pattern of a distributed execution, then there exists a CZC in that pattern, under
the assumption that the size of the noncausal message chain of the PZC is equal
to one, we will then generalize the result to a chain of any size:
Lemma 4.3.
If there exists PZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘) such that |‘|=1
then there exists CZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘).
Proof (by contradiction). Let us consider PZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘) with ‘=m (i.e.,
|‘|=1) and suppose that CZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘) does not exist. As m b Ci, x b + v
k, y m,
send(m) # Ik, y , and + # min(M(Ci, x , Pk)), there must exist Ck, y+1 such that:
Ik, y+1 w
I Ik, y .
In this case, by Definition 2.3, there must exist an event e$ # Ik, y+1 and an event
e" # Ik, y such that e$ w
e e" which is not possible due to the fact that the we relation
is acyclic. K
Lemma 4.4.
If there exists PZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘)
then there exists a CZC.
Proof. Let us consider PZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘). We have two alternatives:
1. if |‘|=1 then the claim follows from Lemma 4.3;
2. if |‘|>1 then let us consider the sequence of checkpoint intervals S(‘).
There are two cases:
2.A. \Iji , zi # S(‘) O c(Iji, zi+1 w
I Ik, y).
By definition 4.2, we get CZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘) and the claim follows;
2.B. _Iji , zi # S(‘): Iji , zi+1 w
I Ik, y .
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FIG. 9. Proof of Lemma 4.4.
Let Ij, z be the first checkpoint interval in S(‘) satisfying the condition of
Case 2.B. There exists at least one causal message chain starting after Cj, z+1 and
ending in Ik, y or in a previous checkpoint interval of Pk . Therefore, the set
M(Cj, z+1 , Pk) is not empty. Let us consider +$ # min(M(Cj, z+1, Pk)); we have two
cases:
2.B.1. send(‘. first) we deliver(+$. last) (see Fig. 9a).
We get ZC(Cj, z+1 , +$, Ik, y , ‘*) where ‘*=‘&‘ and send(‘ . first) # Ij, z . From
Lemma 4.2, there exists PZC(Cj, z+1 , + , Il, t , ‘ ) with |‘ ||‘*|<|‘|;
2.B.2. deliver(+$. last) we send(‘. first) (see Fig. 9b).
We get ZC(Cj, z+1 , [+$ b +"], Ib, s , ‘$) where +" v
b, s ‘$=‘&‘ and send(‘ . first) # Ij, z ;
hence |‘$|<|‘| (see Fig. 9c). By Lemma 4.2 there exists PZC(Cj, z+1 , + , Il, t , ‘ ) with
|‘ | |‘$|. So we have |‘ |< |‘|;
In both cases we obtain a PZC with |‘ |<|‘|.
If we fall into Case 2.B, the previous construction can be applied on the obtained
PZC. After a finite number of steps, either we fall into Case 2A or |‘ |=1; thus, by
Lemma 4.3, we get a CZC. K
4.3. A Characterization Theorem
Let us formally introduce the no-core-Z-cycle property.
Defintion 4.3. A checkpoint and communication pattern (H , CH ) of a distri-
buted execution satisfies the NCZC property if and only if no CZC exists in (H , CH )
The following characterization theorem is straightforwardly derived from lemmas
introduced in previous sections:
Theorem 4.5. A checkpoint and communication pattern (H , CH ) of a distributed
execution satisfies the NZC property if and only if (H , CH ) satisfies the NCZC
property.
Proof.
If part. By Lemma 4.2 if a ZC exists then a PZC exists in (H , CH ). By
Lemma 4.4 if a PZC exists then a CZC exists in (H , CH ). Thus, in terms of proper-
ties, c(NZC) O c(NCZC). Hence NCZC O NZC.
Only if part. If the (H , CH ) satisfies NZC then no CZC exists as CZCs are
Z-cycles. So (H , CH ) satisfies NCZC. K
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5. PREVENTING CORE Z-CYCLES ON-THE-FLY
In this section we first introduce a particular family, namely FNZC , of check-
pointing protocols ensuring NZC. Then we show that a protocol in FNZC cannot
track CZCs on-the-fly. Thus we introduce the notion of a suspect core Z-cycle
(SCZC) which is a checkpoint and communication pattern whose structure
corresponds to the causal part of any CZC. This pattern can be tracked on-the-fly
by protocols in FNZC . Finally, a checkpointing protocol that tracks and prevents
all SCZCs is given.
5.1. A Checkpointing Protocol Family FNZC
We assume the existence of three layers [1]: application layer, checkpointing
protocol layer, and communication system layer. Each process is an instance of the
checkpointing protocol source code. Messages arrive at processes from a communica-
tion system and they will be delivered to the application layer. The application layer
generates events of sending messages and of taking checkpoints (basic checkpoints)
to processes. Send events are delivered to the communication system. A process
takes either basic checkpoints or forced checkpoints. The latter ones are triggered
by a predicate evaluated at the time a message is received from the communication
system layer.
A checkpointing protocol belongs to FNZC if (i) it ensures that the final check-
point and communication pattern of a distributed execution (H , CH ) produced by
that protocol satisfies the NZC property and (ii) the protocol respects the following
constraints:
C1. The usable knowledge at an event e is the restriction of (H , CH ) to e’s
causal past (the causal past of an event e is the set He=[e$ # H | e$ w
e e]);
C2. Upon the arrival of a message m at process Pk , the protocol has to
evaluate the predicate on-the-fly (i.e., without additional delays). If it is evaluated
to true, a forced checkpoint has to be taken before delivering m to the above layer;
C3. The evaluation of the predicate is based on the usable knowledge available
at that event (i.e., the local context of the process plus the control information piggy-
backed on the application message). In other words, no control message is allowed;
C4. All the communication events which arrive from the communication
system (resp. application layer) are processed by the protocol and delivered to the
application layer (resp. communication system) in the same order they arrived.
Every event of taking a basic checkpoint is executed by the protocol;
C5. The content of an application message cannot be interpreted by the
checkpointing protocol;
C6. Information about other processes (such as clock speed and clock drift)
and about the network’s characteristics (such as the maximum message transmission
delay) are not known by any process.
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As an example the checkpointing protocols FDAS and FDI, presented in [23],
and the ones shown in [2, 4, 11, 20] belong to FNZC whereas coordinated check-
pointing protocols [5, 13], the ones where the action to take a forced checkpoint
is triggered by a send event (as an example the CAS and the CASBR protocols
described in [23]), the ones that reorder message deliveries [24], the ones that
invalidate the action to take a basic checkpoint [3, 16], the ones that assume a
maximum drift rate between any pair of physical clocks accessed by processes [6],
and the ones that exploit the semantic of a message content [15] do not belong
to FNZC .
5.2. Suspect Core Z-Cycles
Theorem 4.5 states that a checkpoint and communication pattern of a distributed
execution (H , CH ) satisfies the NZC property if and only if no CZC exists in
(H , CH ). CZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘) can be broken by placing an additional local check-
point of process Pk taken between the send of ‘. first and the delivery of +. last as
shown in Fig. 10a. The instant of time before the event deliver(+. last) represents the
last opportunity for taking an additional (forced) checkpoint in order to remove
that CZC. A CZC is trackable on-the-fly at the last opportunity by a protocol in
FNZC only if its chain ‘ is causal. If ‘ contains one or more noncausal concatena-
tions, the CZC becomes no longer trackable.
FIG. 10. An example of CZC nontrackable on-the-fly by a protocol in FNZC (a), an example of
SCZC pattern (b), and a pattern which is not an SCZC (c).
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The previous argument shows that the best a protocol in FNZC can do to prevent
the formation of core Z-cycles is to remove those checkpoint and communication
patterns whose structure represents the common causal part of any core Z-cycle
which is detectable by a process at the last opportunity. Those considerations lead
to the introduction of a checkpoint and communication pattern, namely an SCZC,
which is trackable by a protocol in FNZC :
Definition 5.1. An SCZC is a checkpoint and communication pattern
SCZC(Ij, z , C i, x , +, Ik, y) such that:
send(m) # Ij, z
_m, m$: Cj, z b m b C i, x b + v
k, y m$ with {+ # min(M(Ci, x , Pk))_3 e # Ij, z+1 : e we deliver(+. last).
As an example SCZC(Ij, z , C i, x , +, Ik, y) is shown in Fig. 10b while Fig. 10c shows
a checkpoint and communication pattern which is not an SCZC as it violates the
constraint (iii) of previous definition (due to the causal message chain +$).
Let us now state a theorem, actually a sufficient condition for the NZC property,
that will be used to design the protocol of the next section:
Theorem 5.1. If a checkpoint and communication pattern of a distributed execu-
tion (H , CH ) does not include any SCZC (i.e., it satisfied the no-suspect-core-Z-cycle
(NSCZC) property) then (H , CH ) satisfies the NZC property.
Proof. From the structure of the CZC and of the SCZC, it trivially follows, in
terms of properties, NSCZC O NCZC. From Theorem 4.5 we have NCZC O
NZC. Hence we get NSCZC O NZC. K
The reader could now wonder if the SCZC is the right pattern to prevent in order
to remove CZCs. In particular, why does the SCZC structure include only the last
checkpoint interval passed through by ‘ (i.e., Ij, z) and not all the checkpoint inter-
vals associated with the final causal part of ‘. This causal part would represent the
largest part of ‘ visible by Pk at the last opportunity.
Let MC be the set of message chains ‘ starting after Ck, y , terminating before Ci, x
and sharing the last message ‘. last. This defines a set X of PZCs, one for each distinct ‘
in MC. If we consider Z-cycles involving Ci, x in Fig. 11 we have MC=[[m1 , m2 , m3],
[m4 , m3]] and X=[PZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , [m1 , m2 , m3]), PZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , [m4 , m3])].
Let us assume the existence of the causal message chain +$ (depicted by a dotted
line). As a consequence we have _e # Ij, z+1 : e  deliver(+. last) which implies
Ij, z+1 w
I Ik, y . Hence, each PZC in X is not a CZC (see Definition 4.2).
If +$ does not exist, Pk cannot safely conclude at the last opportunity that any
CZC involving Ci, x can never be formed. As an example, a message m4 sent in the
interval Ik, y could be received by Pj in Ij, z after the sending of m3 . This noncausal
concatenation is out of the usable knowledge of Pk and gives rise to CZC(Ci, x , +,
Ik, y , [m4 , m3]). Hence, a protocol in FNZC directs a forced checkpoint before
executing deliver(+. last) if no information concerning the closure of the checkpoint
interval Ij, z has been sent to Pk by means of a causal message chain.
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FIG. 11. A set of PZCs involving Ci, x .
5.2.1. A Remark on Characterizations Stronger than NCZC
Imposing additional constraints on the structure of a CZC can lead to charac-
terizations stronger than NCZC. As an example, let us consider the subset X of
CZC such that (i) the length of + is minimal, (ii) ‘ is a member of a set of message
chains that establish the first Z-path between Ck, y and Ci, x (this set contains
message chains sharing the last message), and (iii) ‘ is the chain with minimal
length in that set5. The existence of any CZC implies the existence of a Z-cycle in
X; thus, if X is empty, then CZC is empty.
Although the latter characterization could be interesting from a theoretical point
of view, from a practical one, it does not add information, suitable for protocols in
FNZC , in order to reduce the number of forced checkpoints compared to the one
provided by CZC. In other words, this characterization does not help to find check-
point and communication patterns more refined than SCZC and detectable on-the-
fly. More specifically, the information concerning the time at which the chain ‘ is
established and the length of ‘ does not help as ‘ is, usually, noncausal and, thus,
it cannot be tracked at the last opportunity as shown in the previous section. The
information on the length of + does not help to save forced checkpoints as the
concept of min is related to a set of causal message chains (see Section 4.1) which
includes the one of minimal length. Therefore, preventing a noncausal concatena-
tion (e.g., + vm) due to either any chain of the set min(M(Ci, x , Pk)) or to the one
with minimal length has the same effect in terms of forced checkpoints.
5.3. A Checkpointing Protocol in FNZC
The protocol presented in this section tracks on-the-fly all the SCZC patterns
and breaks them by introducing forced checkpoints before delivering message +. last
(i.e., at the last opportunity). This is done by exploiting the control information
piggybacked on application messages, which encodes the causal past with respect to
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5 In such a case we have temporal and a spatial constraint both on ‘ and on +.
the event of the delivery of a message and the local history of a process (i.e., fully
exploiting the usable knowledge at that event). The protocol uses a vector clock
and a matrix of integers as control information.
5.3.1. Tracking SCZC Patterns
In order to track the formation of SCZC(Ij, z , C i, x , +, Ik, y), upon the arrival of
a message +. last, process Pk has to verify whether conditions for the existence of
that checkpoint and communication pattern are satisfied. In the following paragraphs
we introduce the data structures to accomplish this task.
Tracking + # min(M(Ci, x , Pk)). To detect if + # min(M(Ci, x , Pk)), a vector
clock mechanism is used considering checkpoints of processes as relevant events
[17]. Each process Pk maintains a vector clock VCk whose size corresponds to the
number of processes. VCk[i] stores the maximum checkpoint rank of P i seen by Pk
and VCk[k] stores the rank of the last checkpoint taken by Pk . VCk is initialized
to zero except for the k th entry which is initialized to one. Each application
message m sent by Pk piggybacks the current value of VCk (denoted m.VC). Follow-
ing the updating rule of a vector clock, upon the delivery of a message m, VCk is
updated from m.VC by taking a component-wise maximum.
A causal message chain + including message m as +. last is prime (i.e., + belongs
to some min(M(Ci, V , Pk))), if, upon the delivery of m to process Pk , the following
predicate holds6:
_i: (m.VC[i]>VCk[i]).
Tracking + vk, y m$. To detect if there exists a noncausal concatenation between
a prime causal message chain + and a message m$ in the interval Ik, y , process Pk
maintains a Boolean variable afterfirstsendk . This variable is set to TRUE when
a send event occurs. It is set to FALSE each time a local checkpoint is taken.
Hence, upon the delivery of a message m (with m=+. last), Pk detects that + v
k, y m$
if the following predicate hold:
after firstsendk 7 (_i: (m.VC[i]>VCk[i])).
Tracking Cj, z b m b Ci, x . Each process Pk maintains a vector of integers ImmPredk
of size n and a matrix of integers Predk of size n_n. ImmPredk[l] represents the
maximum rank of the checkpoint interval from which process Pl sent a message m
which has been delivered by Pk in its current checkpoint interval Ik, y&1 (in other
words Cl, ImmPredk [l] is an immediate predecessor of checkpoint Ck, y). Each entry
of this vector is set to &1 every time a checkpoint is taken by Pk .
Predk[i, j] represents, to the knowledge of Pk , the maximum rank of the check-
point interval from which process Pj sent a message m which has been delivered by
Pi in a checkpoint interval Ii, x&1 with xVCk[i]. The matrix Predk is initialized
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6 We use the term ‘‘prime’’ for a chain + # min(M(Ci, V , Pk)) since that chain can be the first one bringing
to Pk the knowledge of the existence of new checkpoints of Pi .
to &1, its content is piggybacked on each message m sent by Pk(m.Pred ), and the
rules to update its entries are the following:
1. Whenever a checkpoint is taken by Pk , Predk[k, &] is updated follows:
\j Predk[k, j]=max(Predk[k, j], ImmPredk[ j]).
2. Upon the arrival of a message m at Pk :
\l, t Predk[l, t]=max(Predk[l, t], m.Pred[l, t]).
Figure 12 shows an example of a checkpoint and communication pattern and the
content of m.Pred[i, j] associated with that pattern.
Tracking _3 e # Ij, z+1: e we deliver(+. last). Upon the arrival of a message m ending
a prime causal chain (i.e., _i: (m.VC[i]>VCk[i])), in order to track the above condi-
tion, we need to know if there exists a j such that m.Pred[i, j]+1 does not belong
to the causal past of the delivery of m. This knowledge is encoded in m.VC[ j] and
VCk[ j]. Hence, the predicate becomes:
_ j : m .Pred[i, j]+1>max(m .VC[ j], VCk[ j]).
5.3.2. Preventing SCZC Patterns
Upon the arrival of a message m at process Pk in Ik, y , if the following predicate
holds,
after firstsendk 7 (_i: (m.VC[i]>VCk[i])
7 (_ j : m.Pred[i, j]+1>max(m.VC[ j], VCk[ j]))),
then process Pk detects that at least one SCZC(Ij, Predk[i, j] , Ci, x , +, Ik, y) is going to
be formed with m=+. last and VCk[i]<xm.VC[i]. In this case Pk directs a
forced checkpoint Ck, y+1 before the delivery of m. The behavior of process Pk is
shown in Fig. 13 (all the procedures and the message handler are executed in
atomic fashion).
FIG. 12. An example of values stored in m.Pred.
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FIG. 13. The protocol.
We also note that, from an operational point of view, the elements of the diagonal
of the matrix Pred are never used by the protocol. Hence, when implementing the
protocol, the vector clock VC can be embedded in that diagonal. Thus, the resulting
control information piggybacked on application messages boils down to a matrix
of n_n integers.
6. A TAXONOMY OF CHECKPOINTING PROTOCOLS IN FNZC
In this section we describe the virtual precedence property introduced by Helary
et al. in [11]. Then we present a taxonomy of checkpointing protocols in FNZC .
This taxonomy splits protocols in two classes: VP-enforced and VP-accordant.
6.1. The Virtual Precedence Property
In a seminal paper [11] Helary et al. sowed that ensuring NZC in a checkpoint
and communication pattern of a distributed execution is a particular application of
a property, namely virtual precedence, defined on an interval-based abstraction of
the distributed execution.
Informally, denoting with 2i, x the x th interval of processes Pi , the abstraction
satisfies VP if and only if it is possible to timestamp messages and intervals in a
way that:
v for any pair of messages m and m$ such that deliver(m) # 2i, x and send(m$) #
2i, x then the timestamp of m is smaller than or equal to the timestamp of m$;
v the timestamp of 2i, x is larger than or equal to the timestamp of all messages
delivered in 2i, x and is smaller than or equal to the timestamp of all messages sent
in 2i, x .
This means that, in the logical time (timestamp), communications can be seen a
causal in each interval. That is, communication events can be reordered in any
interval making all deliver events precede all send events and timestamp does not
decrease along any causal message chain. An example of this is shown in Fig. 14.
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FIG. 14. The virtual precedence property.
In other words, an interval-based abstraction of a distributed execution satisfies
VP if and only if it is possible to associate a timestamping function with intervals
having the following features: (F1) intervals which are connected by a message
must be timestamped in a nondecreasing way (safety part) and (F2) the timestamp
of a process must increase after communication (liveness part). It is easy to check
that if we consider each single event as an interval of the abstraction, the time-
stamping function boils down to Lamport’s scalar clock [14] or FidgeMattern’s
vector time [8, 17]. In the particular context of the checkpointing problem, inter-
vals correspond to checkpoint intervals (i.e., 2i, x #Ii, x) and, then, the abstraction of
the distributed execution corresponds to a checkpoint and communication pattern.
Helary et al. [11] proved a theorem that, in the context of checkpointing, can be
stated as follows:
Theorem 6.1 (Helary et al. [11]). A checkpoint and communication pattern of a
distributed execution (H , CH ) satisfies VP if and only if it satisfies NZC (i.e.,
VP  NZC).
In other words, VP constitutes a common basis for all checkpointing protocols
ensuring NZC. We show, however, that protocols in FNZC can be split into two
subfamilies according to the way they see the previous equivalence between VP
and NZC.
6.2. VP-Enforced Checkpointing Protocols
Let us assume the existence of a function timestamping checkpoint intervals
consistently with F1 and F2. A checkpointing protocol in FNZC can be then
derived as follows. Timestamps are piggybacked on any application message. Upon
the arrival of a message m at Pi in Ii, x , a forced checkpoint will be taken if the
delivery of the message would violate F1 or F2. The checkpoint interval Ii, x+1 is
then timestamped by the protocol according to the timestamping function.
We call any protocol relying on an a priori timestamping function a VP-enforced
protocol. Examples of such protocols are in [4, 11, 12, 22]. In what follows we discuss
the Briatico et al. protocol (BCS) [4] and a protocol based on vector times.
The BCS protocol [4]. In this protocol, an integer is assumed to timestamp
checkpoint intervals. Thus, each process Pk endows a variable (the timestamp)
denoted tsk . The timestamp is managed by Pk according to the following rules:
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1. when starting the execution, tsk is initialized to zero;
2. when sending a message m, a copy of tsk is piggybacked on m (denoted m.ts);
3. when taking a basic checkpoint, tsk :=tsk+1;
4. when a message m arrives at Pk , if m. ts>tsk then a forced checkpoint is
taken by Pk and tsk :=m. ts.
Other protocols have been presented after the BCS protocol; they apply more
refined timestamp management rules that allow the number of forced checkpoints
to be reduced [11, 12].
A vector time-based protocol. Assume a vector time [8, 17] is used to timestamp
checkpoint intervals when considering those intervals as vector time relevant events.
Each process Pk endows a vector of integers TSk (the timestamp) where TSk[i]
represents the highest checkpoint interval of process Pi seen (directly or transitively) by
process Pk . The vector is updated by process Pk according to the following rules:
1. when starting the execution, TSk is initialized to zero, but the k th entry is
set to one;
2. when sending a message m, a copy of TSk is piggybacked on m (denoted m.TS);
3. when taking a basic checkpoint, TSk[k] :=TSk[k]+1;
4. when a message m arrives at Pk , if _j: m.TS[ j]>TSk[ j] then a forced
checkpoint is taken by Pk and \i TSk[i] :=max(TSk[i], m.TS[i]).
This protocol corresponds to the one proposed by Vankatesh et al. in [22]. It
is interesting to note that if we consider that each process takes a basic checkpoint
after each event, the timestamp of the BCS protocol and the Vankatesh et al. vector
boil down to Lamport’s scalar clock and FidgeMattern’s vector time, respectively.
Finally, let us note that, in some sense, VP-enforced protocols correspond to
that protocols’ class that sees the relation of equivalence of Theorem 6.1 from left
to right, i.e., first ensuring VP. As a consequence NZC.
6.3. VP-Accordant Checkpointing Protocols
A VP-accordant protocol prevents the formation of a specific checkpoint and com-
munication pattern which, in turn, avoids the occurrence of Z-cycles; i.e., the predicate
that triggers the action to take a forced checkpoint depends on the checkpoint and com-
munication patterns that are going to be formed if a message would be delivered. Thus,
if the predicate is evaluated to true, at least one ‘‘bad’’ checkpoint and communication
pattern is going to be formed. Then the protocol takes a forced checkpoint to break that
pattern.
As VP  NZC for a VP-accordant protocol there will also exist a timestamping
function that could be used to timestamp checkpoint intervals produced by the protocol
consistently with F1 and F2. However, such a function does not play any role in the
design of the protocol. Examples of VP-accordant protocols are in [2, 20, 23]. Some
of them are discussed below.
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The RUS protocol [20]. This protocol accepts only causal message chains. It
actually prevents the formation of (send } deliver) (i.e., m vm$) patterns in any check-
point interval by means of forced checkpoints, so no noncausal concatenation of
messages can ever occur, preventing the formation of Z-cycles.
The FDAS protocol [23]. FDAS avoids the formation of checkpoint and
communication patterns with the following structure; Ci, x b + v
k, y m$ with + #
min(M(Ci, x , Pk)). As the previous pattern is part of the structure of a PZC, the preven-
tion of all those patterns guarantees the absence of prime Z-cycles and then the NZC
property. FDAS attaches a vector of checkpoint ranks to each application message to
check if that bad pattern is going to be formed. The vector can be used to timestamp
checkpoint intervals consistently with F1 and F2.
The BHMR protocol [2]. This protocol prevents the formation of dependencies
between two checkpoints due to noncausal message chains composed by two causal
message chains (i.e., ‘=+ vk, y +$) if they are not doubled, in a visible way, by a causal
message chain. In terms of concatenation relations, we get that a dependency due to a
noncausal message chain ‘=+ vk, y +$ is doubled by a causal message chain +" if the
pair of checkpoints related by ‘ is also related by +" (i.e., if Ci, x b ‘ b Cj, y then
Ci, x b +" b Cj, h). The doubling is visible by Pk (the only process able to break ‘)
if there exists a causal message chain +$$$ such that +" b +$$$ is prime (i.e., +" b +$$$ #
min(M(Ci, x , Pk))). It is easy to show that this protocol prevents the formation of any
CZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , ‘). In particular there are two cases:
v ‘=+$; i.e., ‘ is a causal message chain. CZC(Ci, x , +, Ik, y , +$) is a particular
dependency between Ci, x and itself that cannot be doubled, so it is prevented by taking
a forced checkpoint before delivering +. last;
v ‘=+1 v+2 v } } } v+l with l>1 where each pair of successive causal message
chains establishes a dependency between two distinct checkpoints that is nondoubled.
Note that the composition of ‘ must exist; otherwise we fall into the previous case.
Then the protocol prevents this pattern by taking l forced checkpoints. l&1 forced
checkpoints are taken to prevent each noncausal concatenation of two successive
causal message chains composing ‘. The last forced checkpoint is taken by Pk to
prevent the pattern + vk, y ‘. first.
The BHMR protocol ensures NZC and then VP. It piggybacks a vector of
checkpoint intervals and a matrix of Booleans on each application message. The
vector can be used to timestamp checkpoint intervals consistently with F1 and F2.
The protocol proposed in this paper is a VP-accordant one as it is based on the
prevention of suspect core Z-cycle patterns.
6.3.1. A Remark on the Rollback-Dependency-Trackability Property
In contrast to our protocol, VP-accordant checkpointing protocols discussed
above (namely RUS, FDAS, and BHMR) have been designed to ensure the rollback-
dependency-trackability property (RDT) [23]. This property stipulates that if there
exists a Z-path between two checkpoints due to a noncausal message chain ‘ (i.e.,
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Ci, x b ‘ b Cj, y), then there must exist at least one causal message chain + which establishes
a Z-path between those checkpoints (i.e., Ci, x b + b Cj, y).
As the Z-cycle is a particular type of noncausal Z-path between a checkpoint and
itself, each checkpoint and communication pattern that satisfies RDT also guaran-
tees NZC. The converse is not true. Intuitively, this implies that each practical
problem solved by NZC can be solved also by RDT at the cost of additional
overhead.
RDT allows the design of simple and decentralized solutions for practical problems
that need to compute the minimum or the maximum global consistent checkpoint that
includes a given set of checkpoints, such as software error recovery and output commit.
On the other hand, ensuring NZC is enough to compute a consistent global check-
point that includes a given checkpoint, which suffices for solving important practical
problems such as domino-free rollback-recovery.
6.4. A Comparison among Checkpointing Protocols
An ideal index for a formal comparison among checkpointing protocols would be
the total number of forced checkpoints directed by a protocol in a given execution.
However, it has been recently proved by Tsai et al. in [21] that there cannot exist
an optimal protocol with respect to this index. An intuitive explanation of this
fact is that the taking of a forced checkpoint influences the future checkpoint and
communication patterns of the execution and this influence is unpredictable. To
overcome this problem a different criterion has been introduced by Baldoni et al.
in [1]. This criterion, the condition criterion, is based on the usable knowledge (see
Section 5.1) of a process at the time the decision to direct a forced checkpoint is
taken. More precisely, let us consider two protocols A and B taking a decision to
direct a forced checkpoint based on the same usable knowledge. We say that A is
better than B if whenever A takes a forced checkpoint, then B takes a forced check-
point. It has been shown that the condition criterion is strongly correlated with the
total number of forced checkpoints [2].
In the rest of the section we compare the performance of our protocol (hereafter P)
with RUS, FDAS, and BHMR by using a simulation study and, when possible, the
condition criterion. Finally, a simulation study comparing P and BCS, as a member
of the VP-enforced family, is presented.
VP-Accordant checkpointing protocols. In the context of protocols ensuring
RDT (i.e., RUS, FDAS, and BHMR), [1] proves that BHMR is better than RUS
and FDAS with respect to the condition criterion. As far as P is concerned, the
pattern prevented by RUS (i.e., m vm$) is a part of an SCZC when considering m as
prime. The pattern prevented by FDAS (i.e., Ci, x b + v
k, y m$ with + # min(M(Ci, x , Pk)))
is a part of an SCZC. Therefore, P is also better than RUS and FDAS with respect
to the condition criterion.
To complete the comparison among VP-accordant protocols we have to com-
pare BHMR with P. Unfortunately, they cannot be evaluated with respect to the
condition criterion. This is because once the same usable knowledge is fixed, if P
takes a forced checkpoint then there is no guarantee that BHMR takes it and vice
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FIG. 15. Checkpoint and communication patterns comparing BHMR and P.
versa. As an example, Fig. 15a shows a checkpoint and communication pattern in
which BHMR takes a forced checkpoint while P does not. Figure 15b shows the
opposite scenario. As a consequence, we compared these protocols by means of a
simulation study which measured the number of forced checkpoints per message
delivery (R) as a function of the average checkpoint interval size (ACI). Experiments
were conducted varying ACI from 100 to 10,000 events. Two distinct strategies for
taking basic checkpoints were considered:
S1: each process takes N basic checkpoints and the period between two
successive basic checkpoints is the same at all processes;
S2: each process takes N basic checkpoints randomly distributed in the whole
execution, with a distinct distribution at each process.
We simulated a point-to-point environment with eight processes in which each
process can send a message to any other and the destination of each message is a
uniformly distributed random variable. Each process executes internal, send, and
receive operations with probability pi=0.9, ps=0.05, and pr=0.05, respectively.
The operation time and the message propagation time are exponentially distributed
with mean value equal to 1 and 5 time units, respectively. Each simulation run
consists of one million events. For each value of ACI we did several simulation runs
with different seeds and the results were within 50 of each other; thus, variance is
not reported in the plots. As we are interested only in counting how many local
states are saved as forced checkpoints per message delivery, the taking of a check-
point has been simulated as an instantaneous action.
Plots in Fig. 16 show a gap of an order of magnitude between values of R
obtained with protocol P and those obtained with BHMR independent of the used
strategy. This deep gap can be easily justified by looking at the checkpoint and
communication patterns of Fig. 15. The probability of occurrence of patterns such
as the one of Fig. 15a is much higher compared to the one of Fig. 15b. For the sake
of completeness, Fig. 16 contains also the curves related to the protocols FDAS and
RUS in order to point out the real performance distance compared to P and BHMR.
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FIG. 16. R vs ACI.
VP-Enforced checkpointing protocols. P and any VP-enforced protocol cannot
be evaluated according to the condition criterion as they follow two distinct approaches
to avoid Z-cycles. Thus, it is easy to find examples of checkpoint and communication
patterns in which P takes a forced checkpoint while the VP-enforced protocol does
not take it and vice versa. So, in this case, we also did a comparison between P and
BCS (as a member of the VP-enforced family) by means of a simulation study
whose results are shown in Fig. 17. BCS shows very good performance with a flat
behavior of R when adopting S1 as the strategy for taking basic checkpoints. In this
case, there is an implicit coordination among processes that ensures the NZC
property by taking only a few forced checkpoints (timestamps increase at the same
speed). In the best case no forced checkpoint is taken at all. The value of R for P
is flat around 0.01.
Strategy S2 represents a bad scenario for BCS as the distributions of the basic
checkpoint events at distinct processes are not correlated. So timestamps increase
at different speeds at distinct processes and, then, the performance of BCS depends
on ACI as shown in Fig. 177. In this case, P’s plot is flat and close to that of
strategy S1.
From previous plots it can be argued that the performance of P (and in general
of any VP-accordant protocol) is more stable compared to that of BCS with
respect to both ACI and the basic checkpointing strategy used. This would suggest
employing P in a checkpointing layer of a general purpose system.
6.5. A Remark on a Previous Taxonomy
In the past a common intuition separated checkpointing protocols in FNZC into
two families: model-based and index-based. This intuition has finally been proposed
as a taxonomy by Elnozahy et al. in [7]. The motivation about the separation was
that ‘‘model-based checkpointing maintains certain checkpoint and communication
structure which is provably domino-free, and index-based coordination enforces the
consistency between checkpoints with the same index.’’ According to a previous
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7 In the worst case, if no correlation exists among the strategies for taking basic checkpoints at distinct
processes (e.g., random checkpointing strategy), each basic checkpoint directs up to n&1 forced check-
points in other processes.
FIG. 17. R vs ACI.
definition, model-based protocols include VP-accordant protocols, while index-
based encompasses protocols based on sequence numbers such as BCS. Using the
previous classification, protocols based on vector times (see Section 6.2) would be
placed in the model-based family since they do not try to enforce consistency
between checkpoints with the same vector time. However, vector-time-based protocols
do not look for domino-free checkpoint and communication structures as we have
shown in Section 6.2.
This problem comes from the fact that the above intuitive separation is not a
sharp (and formal) criterion. The equivalence between VP and NZC provides a
sharp (and formal) separation due to the fact that VP sees all protocols as deriving
from the same source.
7. SUMMARY
Since Randell’s work [19], the problem of building a checkpoint and communi-
cation pattern in which each checkpoint can be used to avoid the domino effect
during a rollback phase has been extensively studied in the past two decades. That
operational property corresponds formally to the fact that a checkpoint and com-
munication pattern satisfies the NZC property.
This paper provided a characterization of the NZC property. The characteriza-
tion is based on a particular type of Z-cycle, namely core Z-cycle, that has to be
absent from the checkpoint and communication pattern of a distributed execution
in order to guarantee the absence of Z-cycles. This result has been obtained due to
the introduction of concatenation relations which allow the structure of checkpoint
and communication patterns to be expressed in easy way. Based on the charac-
terization, we designed a checkpointing protocol that prevents the formation of
suspect core Z-cycles whose structure represents the causal part of any core Z-cycle.
The protocol lies on the following basic hypothesis: (i) the usable knowledge at a
certain event cannot be more than the one included in the causal past of that event,
and (ii) the execution is asynchronous.
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Finally we proposed a taxonomy of communication-induced checkpointing protocols
that satisfy constraints of Section 5.1. This taxonomy is based on the notion of a
VP property, introduced in [11], which, in the particular context of checkpoint-
ing, has been shown to be equivalent to the NZC property.
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